ISM-1246 · September 2026
Hardening server application configurations
Guidelines for system hardening / Server application hardening / Hardening server application configurations
Official control wording
Server applications are hardened using ASD and vendor hardening guidance, with the most restrictive guidance taking precedence when conflicts occur.
Applicability
These are ASD’s applicability markings. Select and tailor controls for your system’s risk, classification and operating context with the system owner and authorising officer.
// Latticework implementation guidance · partial coverage
Set and verify workload isolation defaults
Practical suggestions for a Kubernetes or cloud system. Adapt these steps to your architecture and approved system boundary.
Implementation steps
- Review ASD and vendor hardening guidance for the workload and runtime. Record conflicts and approved exceptions before changing production.
- Set non-root execution, a read-only root filesystem, no privilege escalation, restricted capabilities and an appropriate seccomp profile. Remove unnecessary host namespace and hostPath access. Test application compatibility and admission enforcement.
Evidence to retain
- Keep the guidance review, pinned policy revision, admitted workload manifests and dated scan or PolicyReport with exclusions.
- Use failing and passing fixtures to demonstrate the enforced policy. Retain runtime and node configuration evidence separately; manifest settings do not prove runtime isolation.
What the mapped checks can establish
Findings show selected Kubernetes workload hardening settings; they do not prove that all ASD and vendor guidance was identified, reconciled or implemented.
Responsibility boundary
Platform team: admission controls, runtime and node configuration. Workload team: container settings and compatibility. Organisation: hardening standard, exception approval and system boundary.
The public mapping’s detector allocation is provisional for both managed and self-managed clusters. Agree the responsibility matrix for the engagement; provider inheritance and whole-control ownership require a reviewed system boundary and applicable customer/provider evidence.
Mapped checks to inspect
- kubescape: ism-no-privileged-containers
- kubescape: ism-pod-security-standards
- kubescape: ism-readonly-root-filesystem
- kubescape: ism-non-root-containers
- kubescape: ism-no-privilege-escalation
- kubescape: ism-no-host-access
- kubescape: ism-drop-all-capabilities
- kubescape: ism-seccomp-profile
- kyverno: ism-workload-hardening-security-context
- kyverno: ism-workload-hardening-block-host-namespaces
- kyverno: ism-workload-hardening-block-host-path
- kyverno: ism-workload-hardening-require-read-only-rootfs
These identifiers are from the pinned public mapping. Kyverno mappings describe the policy configuration you must inspect; they do not mean a policy is installed or enforcing. A manifest scan cannot establish live runtime behaviour. Record the exact tool, policy and framework versions, settings, exclusions and execution time with each result.
Review the mapping and control-specific limitations at revision 07b348a. Supporting mapping excerpts (checks, evidence notes and responsibility allocations) are adapted from Latticework Systems’ public repository under Apache-2.0. ASD’s control wording stays under CC BY 4.0.
Official source
ASD’s ISM OSCAL v2026.09.4 · Original catalogue JSON · Pinned checksums and edition details
Control source identifier: ism-1246. Check the official release before relying on this snapshot for an assessment.
Official control wording and applicability: Australian Signals Directorate, © Commonwealth of Australia 2026. September 2026 ISM, OSCAL v2026.09.4, reproduced under CC BY 4.0. Formatting is adapted for this website.
Latticework Systems’ implementation guidance is our interpretation. Provenance and scope.